

Schopenhauer on Sympathy: Ground of Compassion, Sexual Love and Magic

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Chapter 47 of WW2 closes with a remarkable paragraph where Schopenhauer claims that three distinct phenomena, compassion, sexual love, and magic, can be brought under «the common concept of *sympathy*» and that «*sympathy* is to be defined as the empirical emergence (*Hervortreten*) of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical multiplicity of its appearances». What is intriguing about this claim is the seeming exclusivity of just these three phenomena because, in line with Schopenhauer's general philosophy, all empirical phenomena whatsoever are manifestations or objectifications of will and can therefore be said to be in some way instances of the “empirical emergence” of the metaphysical will. This paper investigates the distinguishing features of compassion, sexual love, and magic, which are absent, at least to some degree, in other phenomena. I suggest that their common distinguishing feature is a feeling of mystery. This feeling of mystery arises from the fact that some salient features of empirical compassion, sexual love, and magic are unexplainable by ordinary means because, Schopenhauer argues, they display «a connectedness that is entirely different from the connections mediated by the forms of appearance, which we conceive under the principle of sufficient reason».

Keywords: Sympathy, Compassion, Sexual Love, Magic, Mystery.

Introduction

In *On Ethics*¹, Schopenhauer states that since his WW1 treatment of this topic had been supplemented already with two prize essays published as *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, there remained «simply a small epilogue of isolated remarks [...] in a very fragmentary arrangement»². The arrangement is fragmentary indeed. It discusses in rapid succession many issues such as the importance of moral investigations, moral regret, property rights, punishment,

¹ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, chapter 47, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer*, general editor C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018.

² *Ibid.*, p. 604.

and egoism. Egoism is important. Schopenhauer explains that egoism is the adoption of a *particular* versus a *universal* standpoint or whether one looks inward or outside of oneself – a difference which amounts to recognising one's essence either as will or representation. At this point he restates an often made claim: «All true virtue stems from direct, *intuitive* cognition of the metaphysical identity of all beings». What hinders the intuitive cognition of metaphysical identity is the «principle of individuation» and the intellect's subjection to «the will's unmediated, secret, and despotic influence»³. After a further array of brief notes on death, metempsychosis, magnetic sleep, participation in the thoughts of others, etc., Schopenhauer ends chapter 47 with a remarkable final paragraph quoted here in full:

«Three phenomena are based on this metaphysical identity of the will as thing in itself amid the countless multiplicity of the appearances of the will. These phenomena can be brought under the common (*gemeinsamen*) concept *sympathy*: (1) *compassion*, which, as I have shown, is the basis of justice and loving-kindness, *caritas*; (2) *sexual love*, with its obstinate selectivity, *amor*, which is the life of the species and maintains its precedence over the individual; (3) *magic*, which also includes animal magnetism and sympathetic cures. Thus *sympathy* is to be defined as the empirical emergence (*Hervortreten*) of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical multiplicity of its appearances, which manifests a connectedness that is entirely different from the connections mediated by the forms of appearance, which we conceive under the principle of sufficient reason»⁴.

Admittedly, this passage might seem quite unremarkable at first since it could simply be a restatement of a familiar aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy, namely his claim of the metaphysical unity of all there is in will. However, I aim to show that this initial impression is deceptive because below the seeming familiarity are remarkable implications which invite us to rethink our understanding of the nature and function of Schopenhauer's notion of sympathy.

Let us consider more closely Schopenhauer's claim in this passage, namely, that the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and magic «can be brought under the common concept of *sympathy*» with sympathy defined as «the empirical emergence of the metaphysical identity of the will through the multiplicity of its appearances». So the metaphysical identity of the will, i.e. the will in its singleness and hence all-inclusiveness, emerges (*hervortreten*)

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 615-616.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

empirically from the phenomenon of sympathy. In other words, sympathy has a metaphysical origin or base which shows itself in the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism/magic. Sympathy «manifests» itself, Schopenhauer claims, in a connectedness that is entirely distinct from the empirical connectedness «mediated by the forms of appearance» which we perceive when employing the principle of sufficient reason, which is of course our given, everyday mode of perception.

This leads to two major questions: 1) why are just the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism singled out from the infinite multitude of phenomena all of which, according to Schopenhauer's philosophy of will are manifestations of the will? And 2) how are we to understand the "emergence" of the will in compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism? In other words, what distinguishes the will's emergence in these three phenomena from the will's manifestation or objectification in other empirical phenomena?

In what follows I will first give a brief overview of each of the three phenomena to help us explore what if anything they have in common before attempting to answer these two questions.

1. *Magic and animal magnetism*⁵

Our investigation begins with magic as one of the three phenomena «that can be brought under the common concept of *sympathy*». Schopenhauer includes animal magnetism, sympathetic cures, and many other similar practices or events under magic. His most comprehensive texts on this topic are the chapter *Animal magnetism and magic* in *On Will in Nature*⁶ and *Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues* in *Parerga and Paralipomena* vol. 1. While these two lengthy essays are full of information about these diverse practices and are, therefore, also full of interest how such practices were regarded by someone of

⁵ The German physician Franz Mesmer (1734-1815) coined the term animal magnetism (also called "Mesmerism") for his therapies which, he claimed, used the power of an invisible natural force common to all living entities including plants. Schopenhauer derides Mesmer's use of magnets as a conduit for this invisible force during his therapies. "Mesmerism" was widely used for therapeutic purposes as a form of hypnosis (hypnosis was also practised and defended by Freud). Magic is the use of apparently supernatural powers to change or influence states of persons and events.

⁶ A. Schopenhauer, *On Will in Nature* in Id., *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings*, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer*, general editor C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 405-430.

Schopenhauer's immense intellect and analytical rigour, Schopenhauer, unfortunately, neither describes them in any practical detail nor critically examines the validity of the claims made by practitioners of these procedures which we now tend to group under hypnotism and alternative therapies. In fact, Schopenhauer assumes that his readers are familiar with the relevant information regarding these practices which he evidently takes as true. He backs these findings by citing, as is his habit, numerous literary sources, learned books, journals, and newspaper's reports, and states:

«Whoever nowadays doubts the facts of animal magnetism and the clairvoyance connected with it should not be called incredulous but ignorant. [...] I expect the reader [...] to trust that in cases where I assume something to be factually certain it is known to me from reliable sources or my own experience»⁷.

Schopenhauer's main purpose in these essays is to argue that the success of these therapeutic procedures vindicates his philosophy of will. He claims that the source of the efficacy of these procedures has as yet not been fully understood and was therefore attributed, at least in part, to ritual or the presence and manipulation of material yet nonetheless mysterious artefacts, such as Mesmer's magnets. These were held to explain effects that seemed to defy ordinary, law-governed natural processes. But, according to Schopenhauer, these processes are grounded in «nothing else than the *will* of the magnetist»⁸. He explains that will is *the* active agent in this process, other apparent "agents" such as rituals, surroundings, and artefacts, belong to the realm of representations and are mere "vehicles".

«Generally, it is not consciousness of willing, reflection upon it, but the pure willing itself, separated from all possible representation, which makes magnetism effective ... here will is effective in its primacy, as thing in itself, which requires that representation, as a realm different from it, a secondary one, be closed off as far as possible [...] every external act is only its vehicle»⁹.

⁷ A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 1, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer*, general editor C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 200.

⁸ A. Schopenhauer, *On Will in Nature*, cit., p. 405.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

So the will as thing in itself, i.e. as a metaphysical entity, and not ordinary willing, is operative here. Hence Schopenhauer's statement that «animal magnetism appears as *practical metaphysics*»¹⁰. He continues:

«Moreover because will appears as thing in itself in animal magnetism, we see the *principium individuationis* (space and time), which belongs only to appearance, immediately defeated; its boundaries, separating individuals, are breached; spaces between the magnetist and the somnambulist are no separation; community of thought and movement of will occur; the state of clairvoyance sets aside relations belonging to mere appearance conditioned by space and time: proximity and distance, present and future»¹¹.

It was of course the alleged capacity to overcome limitations of proximity and time that made clairvoyance so mysterious, even uncanny, and thus open to charges of deceit and fraud. However, with the “breaching” of space/time via the suspension of the principle of individuation, Schopenhauer theory breaks metaphysical boundaries to reveal the operation of *metaphysical will* on the *empirical will* in appearances, thus claiming to have solved the mystery of magic and animal magnetism. We will return to this point later.

It is not just amongst human and non-human animals that animal magnetism is effective. Mesmer had already claimed its domain to extend to all animate beings, including plants. Of course, Schopenhauer's philosophy taught right from its inception that the whole world as well as every single item in it, organic and inorganic, is a full and complete individual objectification of will. Hence Schopenhauer records with satisfaction a newspaper report describing a somnambulist in London who «merely by turning her head back and forth compelled the needle of a compass to follow this movement»¹², thus demonstrating the invisible “sympathetic” link, based on will, between organic and inorganic entities.

According to Schopenhauer, magic overlaps only in part with animal magnetism and its associated practices. Indeed, Schopenhauer seems to harbour some scepticism or unease regarding magic in these texts and seems to have

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 409-410. Somnambulism belongs within animal magnetism, yet, according to some of Schopenhauer's descriptions, somnambulists appear to remain mentally and physically active by being able to predict the future and to move about. They thus don't appear to be the usual, merely passive recipients of the magnetist's or hypnotist's instructions.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 409.

mainly magic in mind when urging caution against deceit, easy credulity, and superstition, recommending careful assessment of facts – both positive and negative¹³. He also accuses only magic of misusing its healing powers to malevolent ends (furnishing some justification for historic witch trials, though Schopenhauer regrets these on the whole). On the other hand, he approvingly links a «branch of ancient magic» to a «beneficial purpose, namely sympathetic cures, whose reality is scarcely to be doubted»¹⁴, citing a horse charmer's successful cure¹⁵. And he firmly includes magic within his overall metaphysical explanation of these processes, stating that the effect of magic is «a metaphysical one, not a natural, but a supernatural effect»¹⁶.

Schopenhauer's reserve regarding magic is puzzling, given that magic arguably shares much with other practices approved by him. Maybe this is to account for the persistent and widespread fear of magic or, maybe, to Schopenhauer's desire to vindicate his theories by providing rational and philosophically satisfying explanations only for popular, successful, albeit mysterious, therapies of his time, such as hypnotism or animal magnetism.

2. Sexual love

The following analysis of sexual love is based predominately on Schopenhauer's *Metaphysics of Sexual Love*¹⁷ – a ground-breaking description of human sexuality, quite unique until the arrival of Freud who owes much to it¹⁸.

As is evident from the title *Metaphysics of Sexual Love*, Schopenhauer asserts a metaphysical and not simply a physical or empirical significance to human sexuality via his strong emphasis on the demands of the species. Schopenhauer asserts that the will of the species is behind the intensive yearning of sexuality as manifest in passionate romantic love – a yearning that defies all other needs,

¹³ In line with his own habit of confirming his findings with recourse to authoritative sources. Regarding animal magnetism, Schopenhauer cites Jean-Paul (*Ibid.*, p. 407); for magic he cites, amongst others: Bacon (*Ibid.*, p. 419); Paracelsus (*Ibid.*, p. 420); and Jacob Böhme (*Ibid.*, p. 427). Schopenhauer claims that Bacon defined magic as “experimental metaphysics” (*Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 1, cit., p. 234).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 410.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 411n.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

¹⁷ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, cit., chapter 44.

¹⁸ St. Atzert, *Schopenhauer and Freud*, in *A Companion to Schopenhauer*, ed. by B. Vandenabeele, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester 2012.

indeed often working to the detriment of these needs by putting individuals in emotional, social, and often existential danger. So it is the will of the species that operates in sexual love, that is, will in its metaphysical dimension based on Schopenhauer's contention that «the metaphysical substrate of life reveals itself immediately in the species, and in the individual only by means of this»¹⁹.

Individuals are subject to the will of the species and thus open to its instrumental use via manipulation, domination, and delusion. This can have serious and sometimes fatal consequences for individuals as pointed out by Schopenhauer in his many accounts of unhappy or tragic loves in novels, poems, plays, as well as in newspaper reports. Note that Schopenhauer frequently substitutes terms such as “the spirit” or “the genius” of the species instead of will. He writes:

«In truth the genius of the species wages total war against the individual's protective geniuses, the genius of the species is their enemy and harasses them, always ready to destroy personal happiness without any mercy to realise its end»²⁰.

So the genius of the species is ruthless in its purpose to secure the next generation. This is true for human and non-human animals alike. While it is of course common-place that the primary purpose of sexuality is the continuation of the species via procreation, Schopenhauer contends that for humans the highest demand of the species is not for quantity but quality. Or, in other words, the emphasis is not on “*existentia*” but on “*essentia*” in order to preserve the purity of the type²¹. This entails selectivity.

Unlike non-human animals who mate whenever a mate is available and receptive, the genius of the human species endeavours that only those individuals mate who, as potential parents, can further the quality and purity of the human type as accurately as possible. The will's tool in this endeavour is the passion of sexual love. Schopenhauer insists that «the sole intent of every case of being in love is the procreation of a specifically constituted individual»²². So romantic love is a mere ploy for the higher purposes of the species with the individual simply its instrument. Lovers' ardent desire for each other is only a means to bring together

¹⁹ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, cit., p. 527.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 572.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 550. It is important to note that this was written prior to Darwin's theory of evolution where animals face selection via the survival of the fittest and the human type is not fixed by an unchanging (Platonic) Idea as Schopenhauer believed, but is subject to evolution too.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 551.

two individuals best suited to generate a specific offspring. Their belief that their burning desires and intense hopes aim solely at their own union and happiness is a delusion.

Delusion is the indispensable means of the genius of the species to attain its end according to Schopenhauer. Delusion «hides service to the species under the mask of an egoistic goal»²³. That egoistical goal is of course the happiness of the individual, a happiness ignored or sacrificed for the higher aim of the species. Schopenhauer holds that it is only this higher aim under the guidance of beauty that makes the passion of romantic love “noble and sublime.” He adds that:

«A great many degenerations of the human form arise through a thousand physical accidents and moral misfortunes: yet the true human type in all its parts is always produced anew; something that takes place under the guidance of the sense of beauty, presiding as it does so thoroughly over the sex drive that without it the sex drive would sink into a disgusting need. Accordingly, everyone will, first of all, decisively prefer and ardently desire the most beautiful individuals, i.e. the ones in which the species character is most cleanly imprinted; secondly however, he will particularly require in the other individual just *those* perfections that he himself lacks»²⁴.

Schopenhauer describes the selection process aimed at the preservation of the purity of the human type at length and in great detail, listing in order of priority age, health, shape or stature (skeleton) of the potential lovers, but mentioning also small feet and hair colour amongst numerous other selected features²⁵.

Schopenhauer was aware that many of his readers, particularly those currently in the grip of romantic love, will find his «perspective too physical, too materialistic, however metaphysical, indeed transcendent, it might be at base»²⁶, and he claims that the «whole of this discussion of the metaphysics of love ties in closely with my overall metaphysics»²⁷. This echoes the WW2 chapter 47 passage above where, recall, he lists «*sexual love*, with its obstinate selectivity, *amor*, which is the life of the species and maintains its precedence over the individual»²⁸.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 557.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 555.

²⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 549. For more on Schopenhauer's theory of sexual love see: G. von Tevenar: *Schopenhauer on Sex, Love, and Emotion*, in *A Companion to Schopenhauer*, cit.

²⁶ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, cit., p. 549.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 575.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

3. Compassion

As an important and integral part of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, compassion is discussed throughout his work but in greatest detail in *On the Basis of Morals*²⁹. My analysis is therefore based on this work. Like the others on magic and sexual love, this analysis too will be brief and focused only on issues pertaining to our topic of the nature of Schopenhauer's sympathy.

In opposition to moral theories which *prescribe* what they consider morally good and worthy actions, Schopenhauer states that, consistent with his aim of empirically grounding his philosophical findings where possible, he will only *describe* what actually takes place. Lack of observation of human conduct and its varied motivations is one of the many and extremely well-argued objections Schopenhauer levels against Kant. Schopenhauer also radically dismisses Kant's reliance on reason, resulting in categorical imperatives which reason allegedly autonomously prescribes. In contrast, Schopenhauer relies on observation of human nature and behaviour and on the feeling disclosed in commonly agreed morally good actions which, he declares, must therefore be the basis of morals. The disclosed feeling is compassion.

Schopenhauer concludes that only those actions are morally good which aim, compassionately, at the well-being of others and not, egoistically, at the well-being of agents themselves nor, maliciously, to the detriment or harm of others. Yet Schopenhauer was adamant that egoism underlies the conduct of all human and non-human animals since egoism is inherent in their instinctive drive for survival urged by the will-to-life on all living entities. Egoism thus pervades all sentient life, it is «by its nature, boundless». Indeed «egoism is colossal: it towers above the world»³⁰. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer insists that even the most depraved human beings have at least a weak feeling of compassion. In morally good persons, by contrast, the feeling of compassion is strong and motivates agents to help suffering others by alleviating their pain and want, at times to the detriment of their own well-being, even going as far as willingly sacrificing their own lives. Compassionate agents thus bypass egoism by acting for the well-being of others in the same way as they normally only act toward their own. Schopenhauer further holds that compassion is the source of the two cardinal

²⁹ A. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer, general editor Christopher Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

virtues from which all other virtues arise: these virtues are genuine justice and pure loving-kindness (*Menschenliebe*). Compassion is, hence, morally significant not only individually but generally, even metaphysically, as we will see. By attributing this central and morally elevated role to compassion, Schopenhauer owes us an explanation how, given the ubiquitous nature of egoism, compassion is possible at all. He has two answers: an empirical psychological and a metaphysical one, or, using a different terminology, a natural and a supra-natural answer.

We have mentioned some of the natural or psychological answer already by pointing to Schopenhauer's empiricism in observing and reflecting upon morally good actions taking place in ordinary everyday lives. His explanation for compassion here relies on the belief that a certain kind of identification of agent with suffering others takes place in the compassionate encounter. Schopenhauer describes this kind of identification in a rather convoluted yet highly expressive phrase: «We suffer *with* him, thus *in* him: we feel the pain as *his*, and do not imagine that it is ours»³¹. This poignant statement shows how agent and suffering other can somehow feel the same pain while yet remaining distinct persons. Schopenhauer admits that this phenomenon is “mysterious”. The mystery is allegedly solved by his supra-natural or metaphysical explanation whereby the usual feeling of distinctness and separateness between persons disappears.

Schopenhauer sets out this metaphysical basis of compassion in the last section of *On the Basis of Morals* (and, of course, in *WW1* and *WW2*). He explains that when helping a poor and needy other, what compassionate agents see in that pathetic figure is not a “non-I” but an “I-once-more” thereby annulling the separateness of persons. The same insight is conveyed by Schopenhauer's often quoted Sanskrit formula “*tat-tvam-asi*” (You are that)³². Compassionate agents are aware, then, though not necessarily conceptually, of the metaphysical truth of the illusoriness of the multiplicity of beings. Compassion is hence a kind of knowledge, of seeing the world aright, an inner apprehension of the true nature of the world. One could say, therefore, that the compassionate state is a state of truth, since the compassionate identification with the other as an “I-once-more” discloses the unity of the natural and supra-natural, or phenomenal and metaphysical world according to the fundamental insight of Schopenhauer's philosophy, which is the essential unity of all there is in will.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203 (Schopenhauer's italics).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 254.

However, these explanations lead to a rather puzzling position: if compassionate encounters with suffering others uniquely enable agents to see the world aright by seeing through the principle of individuation, then seeing the world aright necessarily entails seeing it as a suffering world. This implies not only that seeing the world aright is seeing it in accordance with Schopenhauer's philosophy but, further, that only in compassionate encounters and their intuitive awareness of the suffering other as an "I-once-more" can the crucial transformation of egoism to compassionate loving-kindness (*Menschenliebe*) occur. Consequently, no transformation to loving-kindness occurs when agents see happy, non-suffering others. This is indeed Schopenhauer's position. He writes:

«No one will receive evidence of genuine *Menschenliebe* (loving-kindness) from others so long as things are going well for him in every respect. Although the happy man can experience the good will from his relatives and friends in many ways, expressions of that pure, disinterested, objective sympathy for someone else's condition and fate that are the effect of *Menschenliebe* are reserved for one who is suffering in some respect or other. For we do not sympathize with the happy one *as such*, rather he remains *as such* foreign to our heart [...] For unhappiness is the condition of compassion and compassion is the source of *Menschenliebe*»³³.

Schopenhauer's assertion that «we do not sympathise with the happy person *as such*, rather he remains *as such* foreign to our heart» implies that in this case no identification, empirical or metaphysical, takes place and the distinctness and separateness of individuals, of I and other, remains. When others *as such* remain foreign, the transformative insight into the essential unity of all there is in the vision of the other as an "I-once-more" is not achieved³⁴.

Yet Schopenhauer could reject that this position is puzzling by stressing the fact that, according to his philosophy, it is indeed solely the compassionate person who, when seeing the world as a suffering world, sees the world aright³⁵. Those still engaged with happiness are blinded to the truth by the "veil of maya."

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

³⁴ For more on Schopenhauer's theory of compassion and *Menschenliebe*, see: G. von Tevenar, *Schopenhauer and Kant on Menschenliebe* in *The Palgrave Schopenhauer Handbook*, ed. by S. Shapshay, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017.

³⁵ Of course the great saints and life-deniers described in the fourth book of WW1 also see the world aright because they too see the world as a suffering world and hence as of no value.

4. *Empirical sympathy in compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism*

This section examines the empirical role of sympathy in each of the three phenomena while remaining cognisant of the fact that a strict divide between empirical and metaphysical explanation is not possible due to Schopenhauer's philosophical claim that the empirical is simply the objectification or manifestation of the metaphysical and that there is hence only one reality: will. This interdependence of the empirical and metaphysical became apparent already in the foregoing expositions of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism where Schopenhauer moves freely between both aspects. Nonetheless, some attention on empirical aspects will be useful to clarify the role empirical sympathy has in the three phenomena.

The vernacular use of sympathy covers a wide range. Primarily, sympathy refers to feelings of pity and sorrow for the suffering of others, whether close or far, whether personally known or not. Here sympathy can be expressed either as a deeply felt emotion or simply used as a conventional phrase in private and public condolences. This particular notion of sympathy has a moral quality even if not leading to active efforts at consolation or relief. Secondly, the term sympathy is also used to express general agreement and approval, however non-specific it may be in some instances, with what is valued and pursued by others or is exhibited in private or public events. For example: having sympathy with political demonstrations, or sympathy with someone's outburst of frustration at computer failure or train cancellations. We also find some person's character either sympathetic or unsympathetic based on nothing more substantial than the presence or absence of some rather vague and usually unspecifiable sense of rapport or harmony with them. A sense of harmony and participating with the aim of others is also required when sympathetically restoring or performing an artwork that is not one's own. Note, these latter uses of sympathy have no moral quality and neither do the unusual kinds of "sympathetic responses or resonances" Schopenhauer occasionally refers to³⁶.

³⁶ Such as Schopenhauer's use of the notion of "sympathetic nerve" when discussing pain and other bodily perception and sensations in absence of "normal brain function" in his *Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues (Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2, cit., pp. 205,211)*. See also his description of involuntary symptoms of sympathy within the body itself (accelerated heartrate, blushing, and genital erection when strongly agitated) in the chapter *On Physiology and Pathology* in *On Will in Nature, cit., p. 346*.

Clearly, then, vernacular uses of sympathy cover a larger and diverse area. Yet, while expressions and manifestations of sympathy are indeed diverse, they nonetheless have one prominent feature in common, they are all based on and express, however vague in individual contexts, some kind of inner, intuitive understanding and participation (*Theilnahme*) between two or more distinct entities.

Starting with animal magnetism and magic, it is noteworthy that the *Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues in Parerga and Paralipomena 1*, has no mention of sympathy, while in *Animal magnetism and magic in On Will in Nature*, sympathy appears only in discussions of “sympathetic cures” which, recall, covers a very limited area of Schopenhauer’s discourse on animal magnetism/magic and belongs, furthermore, to the somewhat marginalised practices of magic. While the scarcity of the term sympathy in Schopenhauer’s two essays is relevant and will be discussed below, for now let us just concentrate on those background features common-sense usually interprets as sympathy.

Therapeutic use of animal magnetism naturally assumes the presence of some sympathy by the therapist for the suffering other as well as shared inner agreement and approval of the procedure, though this need not always be the case. And we might see in Schopenhauer’s example of the horse-charmer’s sympathetic cure a kind of inner intuitive understanding between different entities. We may even speculate about a certain kind of sympathetic resonance or contagion between participants, or see in magic’s subversive or malevolent practices the sabotaging of sympathy. Yet, clearly, while these features do have some links with our everyday perception of sympathy, they are totally inadequate to do justice to the full range of unusual phenomena in Schopenhauer’s account of magic. We can therefore agree with Schopenhauer that a natural explanation via empirical sympathy cannot be the real explanation since, as he explains below, the “nexus” is of “a completely different order” than one found in nature.

«Animal magnetism, sympathetic cures, magic, second sight, truth-dreaming, spirit-seeing, and visions of all kinds are related appearances, branches of one stem, and provide certain, irrefutable indication of a nexus of being that rests on a completely different order of things than nature, which has space, time, and causality as its basis»³⁷.

³⁷ A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, cit., p. 232.

Turning now to Schopenhauer's account of sexual love with its emphasis on selectivity on behalf of the species, we find equally sparse evidence of the presence of sympathy. Sympathy is only mentioned twice in the whole lengthy *Metaphysics of Sexual Love*. First, in a citation by Schopenhauer of a book «famous for 250 years» where love is described as «a sympathy of the blood prompted by a certain influence of the stars» and, second, onlookers sympathy when observing the pains and struggles of young lovers»³⁸. So, as before, let us attend to background assumptions.

Starting from the perspective of the lovers, we can assume sympathy as pity or sorrow for the beloved where appropriate, also a certain agreement in outlook and approval of each other, as well as an inner understanding and harmony, though these shared sympathetic features are neither necessary nor sufficient for sexual love. Additionally, any sympathy usually vanishes if love is rejected, lost, or gives rise to extreme jealousy, occasionally leading to “crimes of passion” – see Othello. The possibility of painful conflicts between love and hate was also noted by Schopenhauer. Indeed, Schopenhauer claims that «sexual love is compatible with even the most extreme hatred of its object»³⁹.

Turning now to possible expressions of sympathy from the social environments of lovers, here we can safely assume sympathy for unhappy and tragic loves, as well as understanding and approval of lovers' quests, though this may be tempered by disapproval due to dynastic, moral, or conventional reasons. Generally though, sympathetic participation in and approval of lovers' quests seems hard-wired in our Western culture-based glorification and intense interest in passionate romantic love.

It might be objected that including social responses of sympathy in our assessment of sexual love is misguided. Yet such inclusion is warranted, I suggest, by Schopenhauer's own emphasis not only on biological but also on social and cultural functions of sexual love, confirmed, he claims, in the intense and unending interest given to it in art and popular culture. Against sceptics, Schopenhauer declares that «it is not possible that something alien to human nature and inconsistent with it [...] could be tirelessly portrayed in all ages by poets of genius, and received by humanity with unwavering interest»⁴⁰.

³⁸ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, cit., pp. 568-569.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 572.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 548.

We can conclude, then, that while there is some empirical evidence of sympathy in sexual love, both in lovers and their social environment, that presence is limited and quite marginal to the passion of sexual love itself.

Turning now to compassion. Obviously, sympathy as an empirical feature plays a major role in compassion and is often regarded as identical or at least closely aligned to it. Yet for Schopenhauer compassion and sympathy are not synonymous. Despite the fact that Schopenhauer sometimes uses these terms interchangeably, there is nonetheless a subtle difference shown most clearly in his use of sympathy as *Theilnahme* (participation). This difference, though neither clear-cut nor consistent in his writings, is nonetheless important as the following five quotations (Q1-Q5) show:

Q1: «The everyday phenomenon of compassion (*Mitleid*), i.e. the wholly immediate sympathy (*Theilnahme*), independent of every other consideration»⁴¹.

Q2: «This wholly immediate, indeed instinctual sympathy (*Theilnahme*) for the suffering of others, compassion, is the sole source of such actions [...] [that] have moral worth»⁴².

Q3: «People try to hide this [the continuous series of accidents both great and small] as much as possible, because they know that others will rarely show sympathy (*Theilnahme*) or compassion (*Mitleid*)»⁴³.

And when discussing friendship Schopenhauer suggests that:

Q4: «Compassion is apparent (*zeigt sich*) in our heartfelt participation (*Theilnahme*) with the friend's well-being and woe»⁴⁴.

Q5: «By contrast, the good character lives in an external world homogeneous with his essence: others are for him not “not-I” but “I-once-more”. Thus his primordial relationship to everyone is one of friendship: he feels himself akin to all beings inside, immediately participates with sympathy (*nimmt unmittelbar Theil*) in their well-being and woe, and presupposes with confidence the same participation (*Theilnahme*) on their part»⁴⁵.

⁴¹ A. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morals*, cit., p. 200.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁴³ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer*, ed. by C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 350.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

⁴⁵ A. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morals*, cit., pp. 254-255.

I have cited these five quotations to show Schopenhauer's subtly differentiated use of *Sympathie* (sympathy), *Theilnahme* (participation, also rightly translated as sympathy), and *Mitleid* (compassion). In Q1 and Q2, for instance, *Theilnahme* and *Mitleid* are equivalent, yet Q3 speaks of *Theilnahme oder Mitleid*, where the "or" could indicate an alternative but, more likely given the social context, indicates an ascending order with *Mitleid* a step up from *Theilnahme*. In Q4, compassion is either an ingredient or, maybe, the result of sincere participation (*Theilnahme*) with the friend's mental states, while Q5, also speaking of friendship, suggests that the mysterious "I-once-more" encounter can include "everyone through the primordial relationship of friendship". Here, however, sympathy as *Theilnahme* in friendship is not limited to one personal friend, but extended to "*all beings because akin*" (my italics).

Q4 confirms that *Theilnahme* is just one of the many possible ways compassion can show itself (*zeigt sich*). For instance, compassion can show itself in justice, loving-kindness, fairness, care, forgiveness, even in looking-away; while *Theilnahme* shows itself in addition also in taking part (*theilnehmen*) in mental or physical events, happy or sad. It is clear, then, that even in the vernacular *Theilnahme* it is not straightforwardly synonymous with compassion but is usually seen as an ingredient or part of it. The case is similar in Q5, where Schopenhauer states that agents act with immediate participation towards the weal and woe of others and confidently expect of others the same attitude of participation towards themselves. Note that they are neither showing nor expecting compassion, the concern here is toward *both the weal and woe* of others with plain *Theilnahme* the appropriate attitude⁴⁶.

To summarise: sympathy in the conventional empirical sense is clearly present, though in greatly varying degrees, in the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism/magic. From a strong presence in compassion to a weak and quite questionable one in sexual love and animal magnetism/magic. Doubts about the latter are due mainly to malevolent aspects of magic and the possibility of hostile breakdown in sexual love, as noted by Schopenhauer himself. Sympathy in the unconventional sense of resonance as described in footnote 34 above, fits neither of the three phenomena except,

⁴⁶ Scheler, a student of Husserl, is particularly instructive here. Scheler makes multiple fine-grained distinctions of the sympathetic emotions, such as empathy, fellow-feeling, participation, sympathy, and compassion. See: Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, Transaction Publishers, 2009.

perhaps, when giving it a strong metaphorical turn, or, better still, when subsumed in his metaphysics of will, as within the metaphysical will's overarching inclusiveness there is ample explanatory space for such sympathetic resonances.

Yet it has become obvious that these diverse meanings of sympathy are not what Schopenhauer is pointing to in the above WW2 chapter 47 passage, since these meanings apply, in some measure, universally to all there is in the Schopenhauerian world. They therefore ignore the fact that Schopenhauer specifically singled out from amongst the infinite multitude of empirical phenomena just these three: compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism. So what exactly is exclusive to just these three phenomena?

5. Mystery: the common feature of compassion, sexual love, and magic

As demonstrated, conventional understanding of sympathy is unable to serve as a common characteristic of the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism. Not only is sympathy unequally present in the three phenomena it is also, more importantly, not exclusive to them. We can test this with two basic features of sympathy.

The first feature is other-relatedness as the grounding feature of every kind of sympathy. Other-relatedness is *the* foundation of all social structures, of all living-together of human and non-human animals whether in communities or herds. It is thus also the base of all functions relating to communities or herds, such as communication, co-operation, protection, and so on. Clearly, then, sympathy as other-relatedness is not exclusive to the three phenomena. The second basic feature of sympathy is participation: the willingness to engage with the concerns of others, either for pleasure, relief of pain, or a perceived common goal. Yet numerous activities fall within this domain, such as knitting circles, team sports, and going to war together. So, sympathy as participation, too, is not exclusive to the three phenomena.

I therefore suggest "mystery" as that exclusive common feature. Within Schopenhauer's philosophy of the metaphysical unity of all there is, a feature that could possibly hold compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism/magic together in one exclusive group cannot have purely empirical characteristics but must be capable to straddle the natural and metaphysical divide. Such a feature, I suggest, is the sense of the mysterious, the sense of the supra-natural, of the

unexplainable, which is present in all three phenomena as described by Schopenhauer.

Mystery as a feature of compassion is one of Schopenhauer's frequently expressed claims. Mystery is present in compassion's overcoming of egoism⁴⁷; in the mysterious fact that we feel the pain of the other «*with him, thus in him: we feel the pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours*»⁴⁸; and in the mystery of grasping the metaphysical truth of "*Tat tvam asi*" (You are That) which annuls individuality. Indeed, in §22 of *On the Basis of Morals*, Schopenhauer emphatically declares that within the empirical world and, hence, within the limitation of our empirical understanding, compassion cannot be explained. Any explanation of compassion requires recourse to the mysterious "intervention" or "causal activity" of the metaphysical will.

Turning now to animal magnetism and magic, these are also obviously highly mysterious, since the various processes taking place in animal magnetism (magic, somnambulism, clairvoyance, sympathetic cures, prophetic dreams, and so on) defy, Schopenhauer claims, any natural explanation in line with the principle of sufficient reason. As mentioned, this is particularly evident in clairvoyance, as clairvoyance with its seeming overcoming of space and time is a particularly spectacular instance of a non-natural, causality-defying process. Schopenhauer's descriptions of these processes in his *Animal magnetism and magic* and in his *Essay on Spirit-seeing and related issues* very much encourage this air of mystery despite his avowed aim to stay within the facts as given to him. Hence he writes that whoever «nowadays doubts the facts of animal magnetism and the clairvoyance connected with it should not be called incredulous but ignorant» and he expects readers to trust that whatever he reports is «factually certain»⁴⁹. There is, moreover, a clear mixing of the mysterious with the empirically factual in these texts, evident in Schopenhauer's frequent references to the explanatory power of idealism, often mentioning Kant, while at the same time implying that only when going beyond the explanations of idealism toward his own philosophy of will can the mystery be fully solved. Thus he writes about a

«... *factual* confirmation, as unexpected as it is certain, of the Kantian fundamental doctrine of the opposition of appearance and thing in itself and of the laws applying to both ... we see all the facts considered here, called magical, being rooted in the thing in

⁴⁷ See: A. Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morals*, cit., pp. 201, 255.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203 (Schopenhauer's italics).

⁴⁹ A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 1, cit., p. 200.

itself and producing phenomena in the world of appearances that, according to the laws of this world, can never be explained ... But not only the Kantian, but also my own philosophy receives important confirmation through closer inspection of these facts, namely that in all those phenomena the actual agent is the *will* alone»⁵⁰.

We can see, then, that not only is Schopenhauer keen to establish these magical phenomena as facts, he also places them within the authoritative framework of Kant's transcendental idealism in order to go beyond it to his own philosophy of will as the real solution of a mystery «that can never be explained according to the laws of this world.»

Turning now to the phenomenon of sexual love, one might protest that nothing is less mysterious than sex as sex is a fact of nature and is performed un-mysteriously everywhere at all times by human and non-human animals alike. This protest misses Schopenhauer's point entirely. Schopenhauer is not talking about sex as such (though he does that as well) as our strong sexual urge is readily explained empirically as one of our most fundamental needs. Schopenhauer is also not talking about sexual love as part of a loving relationship. What Schopenhauer is talking about is the extraordinary passion of extraordinary sexual love which, he claims, is experienced like an assault on one's very being, an eruption of an irresistible power into one's life that overrides all other concerns as if of no value and renders one helpless. Passionate sexual love «makes its entrance like a malevolent demon, intent on turning everything upside down, bringing [...] chaos and confusion»⁵¹. Schopenhauer admits that such a love is «not exactly a day-to-day experience» yet he strongly defends its existence against sceptics like La Rouchefoucauld who claimed «that passionate love is like ghosts: everyone talks about them but no one has seen them»⁵². So, when Schopenhauer describes passionate sexual love he describes something that is not only extremely rare and inexplicable, but also something that makes “no sense” within ordinary lives.

Yet rarity is not the same as mystery. The mystery of sexual love described by Schopenhauer lies in the fact that in the passionate desire for union with one and only one particular individual, the will of the species makes manifest its determination, assisted by delusion, that a specifically constituted being, capable of exhibiting the true and perfect human type, should be born. The mystery of

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 233 (Schopenhauer's italics).

⁵¹ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, cit., p. 550.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 545-546.

passionate sexual love is hence a metaphysical mystery revealed in the will of the species instrumentally manipulating the fated lovers. Schopenhauer's description of passionate sexual love is therefore a good example of his explication of sympathy in the WW2 chapter 47 passage where, recall, sympathy is «the empirical emergence» of the metaphysical will manifesting «a connectedness that is entirely different from the connections mediated by the forms of appearance»⁵³. The metaphysical will of the species determines the procreation of a specifically constituted individual despite the obvious fact that for most passionate lovers the constitution of a possible future child is the last thing on their mind. So passionate sexual love is mysterious both on the empirical and metaphysical level. While it is true that Schopenhauer's theory of sexual love with its emphasis on the dominant role of the species fails in a post-Darwinian age, nonetheless, within his philosophy, the title *Metaphysics of Sexual Love* is apt.

I suggest that the sense of mystery palpable in Schopenhauer's descriptions of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism answers both questions raised above, namely (1) why just these three phenomena are singled out from the infinite multitude of phenomena? And (2) how are we to understand the "emergence" of the will in compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism/magic?

As Schopenhauer sees it, the empirical facts of compassion, sexual love, and animal magnetism/magic defy everyday explanations according to the principle of sufficient reason. Their sheer mystery is evidence of the need, he contends, of the metaphysical explanation he provides of the metaphysical will's direct emergence within the world of phenomena. However, it is still unclear how we are to understand the role assigned to sympathy in this emergence. As we have seen, our common-sense understanding of sympathy has proved inadequate as an explanation.

6. *The metaphysical nature of Schopenhauer's sympathy*

Clearly, strictly speaking, no divide between natural and metaphysical sympathy should be made as they necessarily entail each other according to Schopenhauer's philosophy. This is obvious to the non-dualist Schopenhauer, yet he observes that "ordinary materialists"

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

«... attempt to show that all phenomena, even mental phenomena, are physical: and this is quite correct; only they do not see that everything physical is, on the other hand and at the same time, metaphysical as well. But this is also hard to see without *Kant*; since it presupposes the distinction between appearance and thing in itself»⁵⁴.

While identity between metaphysical and physical phenomena is a given for Schopenhauer and grounds his claims in the WW2 chapter 47 passage, this identity, because of its very universality, is nonetheless of limited help when trying to unravel the precise role assigned to sympathy in this passage. Recall two distinct claims made there on behalf of sympathy: first «These phenomena can be brought under the common (*gemeinsamen*) concept of *sympathy*» and second «Thus *sympathy* is to be defined as the empirical emergence (*Hervortreten*) of the metaphysical identity of the thing in itself amid the countless multiplicity of appearances of the will»⁵⁵.

Regarding the first claim: the concept of sympathy is *gemeinsam* (common) to the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and magic. Because *gemeinsam* is not always synonymous with common-to-all, we may assume that the relevant sympathy is *gemeinsam* only to the three phenomena and not to all others. We have found that the sense of mystery is also *gemeinsam* to the three phenomena. I therefore suggest that sympathy and mystery somehow belong together, converge as it were, in the common/*gemeinsame* process described by Schopenhauer in this passage.

Regarding the second claim: I suggest interpreting Schopenhauer's definition of sympathy as used in the WW2 chapter 47 passage as follows: sympathy just is *the moment of emergence* of the metaphysical will in the empirical world, or, expressed differently, sympathy is *the vehicle for this emergence*, its tool. This interpretation has the following welcome result: it reveals how sympathy belongs both to the metaphysical and the empirical world and is its mysterious connecting feature. Sympathy has this connecting feature because participation (*Theilnahme*) is, as noted already in our enquiry into the empirical characteristic of sympathy, one of its essential features. More on this below.

This is helpful in solving some of the queries we have encountered in this enquiry. For instance why empirical sympathy is barely mentioned in the empirical descriptions given by Schopenhauer of compassion, sexual love, and magic. On the above interpretation, this is so because what Schopenhauer

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 617 (Schopenhauer's italics).

highlights in these descriptions is precisely the mysterious processes at odds with our familiar everyday lives. Such as, recall, the apparent non-applicability of the principle of sufficient reason in magic; the “breaching” of space/time allowing «community of thought and movement of will» to occur in clairvoyance⁵⁶; and the suspension of the principle of individuation in compassion. All this is explained, Schopenhauer contends, by «the empirical emergence of the metaphysical will» which, according to my interpretation, is the mysterious “breaching” of the boundary of the empirical and metaphysical by sympathy’s participation in both domains.

To summarise: in answer to some of the many questions raised by the remarkable passage in WW2 chapter 47, we have analysed in detail how the three phenomena of compassion, sexual love, and magic can be «brought under the common concept of *sympathy*». We have found that the sense of mystery common (*gemeinsam*) to the three phenomena is closely linked to the kind of sympathy understood as participation (*Theilnahme*)⁵⁷. This convergence of mystery and sympathy, unique to the three phenomena, is either the moment, or facilitator, or vehicle of «the emergence of the metaphysical will into the empirical domain».

Clearly, this is all highly speculative. Yet Schopenhauer gives us no hint how we are to imagine or construct more clearly this mysterious process of interaction between the world as will and the world as phenomenon without falling into contradiction⁵⁸. This makes any serious evaluation about today’s value of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical explanation extremely difficult. Today, we might find other solutions to those mysteries, solutions provided by biology, psychology, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience, more acceptable. Yet this does not detract from the inner coherence of Schopenhauer’s attempted empirical-metaphysical solution within his philosophy.

⁵⁶ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, cit., pp. 409-410.

⁵⁷ Admittedly, Schopenhauer uses the German *Sympathie* and not *Theilnahme* in this passage. This does not undermine my claim about the defining link of sympathy with participation as demonstrated in this paper and in the vernacular use of these terms.

⁵⁸ There are of course many theories about this process of interaction. Many commentators have grappled heroically with this topic, particularly J.E. Atwell, *On the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will*, University of California Press, Berkeley (CA) 1995. For interesting proposals see S. Shapshay, *Poetic Intuition and the Bounds of Sense: Metaphor and Metonymy in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy*, in *Better Consciousness*, ed. by Christopher Janaway and Alex Neill, Wiley-Blackwell, London 2009; and A. Welchman, *Schopenhauer’s Two Metaphysics: Transcendental and Transcendent*, in *The Palgrave Schopenhauer Handbook*, cit.

Conclusion

In conclusion I like to speculate some more on how Schopenhauer's view of the nature and role of sympathy as analysed above might affect our contemporary understanding of sympathy. I suggest it will be greatly enriched. It seems to me that in our ordinary understanding of sympathy, particularly when expressed in ordinary contexts as discussed above, sympathy is usually seen as a two-directional relation moving between, say, compassionate agent and needy other, or between two lovers, or between therapist and patient. One could also describe these movements as taking place along a horizontal line between two points. Now Schopenhauer, in my understanding, introduces as an additional point the emergence of metaphysical will into the empirical domain, thus making it a three-directional relation. Consider how, in traditional religious discourse, this third relational point is usually occupied by divine providence. Acts of divine providence, too, can be described as metaphysical emergence into the empirical world by way of miracles and other interventions. Indeed, petitional prayers by the faithful plead precisely for such providential metaphysical-divine intervention. And just as Schopenhauer claims that all true virtue stems from direct intuitive cognition, beyond reason and concepts, believers similarly feel that they are in a mysterious way in contact with and guided by the divine, beyond reason and concepts. In both cases the contact or emergence is beyond reach of the principle of sufficient reason. This third relational point greatly enriches the phenomenology of sympathy by answering in a suitably mysterious yet nonetheless satisfying way questions not ordinarily amenable to our usual rational/empirical discourse.

We can see, then, that this third relational point, essentially external to the empirical two-directedness of sympathetic relations but infusing and directing them with its dynamic, is a great plus in Schopenhauer's notion of sympathy. Nonetheless, we could do better. We could retain the richness of his notion by keeping the important third point intact yet do away with the cumbersome Schopenhauerian metaphysics of will. In other words, we could retain Schopenhauer's always rewarding psychological insights and his rich notion of sympathy but, instead of will, fill the important third relational point with reference to, say, biology, psychology, evolutionary theory, neuroscience, or other appropriate field of enquiry. Indeed, we could go still further and posit as the third relational point ethical values such as care and attentiveness for sentient beings able to feel pain

and thus include, very much in line with Schopenhauer's thinking, also animals and the wider environment⁵⁹.

Clearly though, while we might regard this return to a now enriched yet strictly empirical world an improvement in our overall understanding of the notion of sympathy, there is no doubt that Schopenhauer would deeply deplore this loss of metaphysical grounding⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ See Sandra Shapshay: *Schopenhauer on the Moral Considerability of Animals: Toward a less Anthropocentric Ethics* in *The Palgrave Schopenhauer Handbook*, Sandra Shapshay [ed], Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

⁶⁰ I am grateful to Christopher Janaway for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.